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Abstract—A core feature of Content-Centric Networking
(CCN) is opportunistic content caching in routers. It enables
routers to satisfy content requests with in-network cached copies,
thereby reducing bandwidth utilization, decreasing congestion,
and improving overall content retrieval latency.
One major drawback of in-network caching is that content
producers have no knowledge about where their content is stored.
This is problematic if a producer wishes to delete its content.
In this paper, we show how to address this problem with a
protocol called BEAD (Best-Effort Autonomous Deletion). BEAD
achieves content deletion via small and secure packets that
resemble current CCN messages. We discuss several methods of
routing BEAD messages from producers to caching routers with
varying levels of network overhead and efficacy. We assess BEAD
performance via simulations and provide a detailed analysis of
its properties.
Keywords—Content-Centric Networking, caching, best-effort
content deletion, controlled flooding, forwarding histories, account-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is a relatively recent
internetworking paradigm touted as an alternative current IP-
based Internet architecture. While IP traffic consists of packets
between communicating end-points, CCN traffic is comprised
of explicit requests for, and responses to, named content
objects.
An important features of name-based content retrieval is
decoupling of content from its producer. This enables more
natural content distribution by allowing routers to oppor-
tunistically cache content within the network. Cached content
can be returned in response to future requests, which are
called interests. This reduces the need to forward interests
to content producers, thus lowering network congestion and
content retrieval latency.
However, router caches are not mandatory in CCN. In
some cases, caching content might not be beneficial, e.g.,
for routers with high content processing speeds, since high
arrival rates translate to less time spent in cache. If this
cache lifetime is very short, the probability of cache misses
increases and cache’s utility decreases proportionally. Indeed,
some prior literature shows (via simulations and experiments)
that caching at the edges of the internetwork, i.e., at consumer-
facing routers, is most beneficial and more cost-effective than
doing so in the core, i.e., in transit routers [1].
To help caching routers determine the lifetime of cached
content, the latter includes an optional ExpiryTime field.
Routers are expected to flush content once this time elapses.
However, a router can choose to keep content cached beyond
its lifetime. Lifetime of content in a particular router’s cache
depends entirely upon that router’s implementation and policy.
This uncertainty (or freedom) means that content may linger
in the network for a very long time.
One notable drawback of this libertarian approach to
caching is that some content may need to be deleted before
ExpiryTime elapses. Consider content that frequently (yet
sporadically) evolves over time, e.g., news articles. The appear-
ance of breaking-news articles is unscheduled. As situations
develop, updates and corrections to the content occur at unpre-
dictable times. Such updates supersede previously distributed
content by rendering it stale. Thus, in this case, producers need
a way to remove old content. Another example is content
(that has released and subsequently cached) which contains
erroneous information. As errors are detected and corrected, a
producer needs to flush the incorrect older version.
The deletion problem occurs because ExpiryTime is the
only way for a producer to communicate anticipated content
lifetime to the network. However, a producer can not change
its mind after content has been published and distributed.
Thus, there is a need for a safety mechanism for in-network
content deletion. In this paper, we design a protocol – Best-
Effort and Autonomous Deletion (BEAD) – that mitigates this
problem. In the process, we encounter and address several
challenges, including efficacy, efficiency and security. We also
experimentally assess the proposed BEAD protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
overviews CCN. Related work is summarized in Section III.
Section IV presents minimal requirements for content deletion.
Sections V and VI describe authentication and routing of
deletion requests in BEAD, respectively. The BEAD protocol
is analyzed in Section VII and its performance is assessed
in Section VIII. The paper ends with a discussion of BEAD
optimizations and practical factors in Section IX. Future work
is summarized in Section X.
II. CCN OVERVIEW
This section provides an overview of the CCN architecture
and protocol, according to the most recent specification [2].
Given familiarity with CCN, it can be skipped without loss of
continuity.
Unlike IP, which focuses on addressable end-hosts, CCN
emphasizes named and addressable content. A consumer issues
a request, called an interest, specifying the name of desired
content. CCN names are structured simular to URIs. For exam-
ple, a particular content produced by the NSA might be named:
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lci:/us/gov/DoD/NSA/Snowden-Diary. An interest
for a particular content N is routed towards an authoritative
producer for the content based on N itself. In CCN, both
interest and content messages have general-purpose Payload
fields. Consumers can use an interest’s Payload field to
push information to producers, while producers use a content’s
Payload field to carry actual application data.
As an interest traverses the network, each router determines
if a copy of requested content is cached in its Content Store
(CS). If a cache hit occurs, the router satisfies the interest by
sending the matching content on the interface on which the
interest arrived. Otherwise, the router (1) records some state
derived from the interest in its Pending Interest Table (PIT)
in order to provide a backwards path for the future content,
and (2) forwards the interest to the next hop(s) specified
in its Forwarding Information Base (FIB). State retained in
the PIT contains the content name and the interface(s) on
which interests for that name have been received. A FIB
is a routing table that maps hierarchical name prefixes to
outbound interfaces. Longest-Prefix Matching (LPM) is used
to determine the matching FIB entry.
A router R can collapse multiple interests into the same
PIT entry whenever:
1) R receives an interest for name N
2) R does not have content N in its cache
3) R’s PIT already contains an entry for N
When interest collapsing occurs, R only records the interface
on which the new interest arrived and drops that interest.
Whenever requested content arrives, R forwards it on all
interfaces listed in the corresponding PIT entry. Afterwards,
the PIT entry is flushed.
If no router can finds a cached copy of requested content
in its cache, the interest eventually reaches the producer that
responds with the matching content, if possible. If the producer
can not provide it (e.g., content does not exist) a NACK is
generated [2], [3]. As content traverses the reverse path to the
consumer, routers may choose to cache it in anticipation of
future requests. As mentioned earlier, each content includes a
producer-set ExpiryTime field. This value is content- and
application-specific. However, each router can use any cache
management algorithm, e.g., LRU or LFU.
III. RELATED WORK
Lack of on-demand content deletion is a well-known prob-
lem in CCN [4]–[9]. The problem of unsafe replicas or stale
content in CCN was first considered in [10]. Analytical and
experimental assessment showed that: “...the more frequently
content is requested the higher is the chance of one request
ending up in between a revocation and the eviction [of the
stale key].” The proposed solution relies on a monotonically
decreasing cache lifetime enforced by cooperating routers. This
does not allow a producer to change the lifetime after content
is published; it only seeks to minimize the time window when
stale or unsafe replicas can be accessed.
[4] proposed a mechanism to implement revocation of con-
tent without input from the consumer. The proposed approach
uses the ccnx-sync protocol to perform OCSP-like [11] syn-
chronization of key data, i.e., determine content that has been
revoked. This requires proactive behavior by each participating
repository. [5] suggests using ChronoSync [12] to synchronize
revoked key endorsements among group members. Revocation,
however, is not the same as cache deletion. Revoked content,
if still cached, can be inadvertently accessed by malicious or
benign consumers.
[13] discussed a new caching technique allowing routers
to proactively share content with downstream peers which
did explicitly request that content. The suggested multicast
forwarding strategy serves to increase the number of replicas
in the network. However, unsolicited content objects can be
seen as a form of attack similar to cache poisoning [7].
The concept of cost-aware caching in CCN was introduced
in [14]–[18]. Various economic incentives for ISPs and ASs
to cache content on behalf of producers have been explored.
Cost-aware routers that cache based on popularity and eco-
nomic incentives are studied in [19]. In general, the economic
problem of supporting prioritized caching in the network is
addressed without any attention to the inverse problem: how
is content removed from caches?
IV. PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS
Our motivation stems from the need to remove stale or
erroneous content from the network, i.e., from routers’ caches.
One intuitive way of doing this is through the use of version-
ing, whereby the content naming format includes a component
that explicitly reflects the current version. For example, the
content of BBC’s World News web-page could be named:
lci:/bbc/news/world/v2.4. One immediate drawback
to this approach is that consumers cannot be expected to know
the latest version in order to form such a name. Alternatively,
timestamps could be used. In that case, the same BBC page
could be named lci:/bbc/news/world/1449187200.1
However, it is unclear how consumers would determine such
timestamps, without which they can not request content.
The main problem with versioning and timestamps is that
they can not handle unpredictable content updates. In current
CCN design, producers are oblivious to where and for how
long their content is stored in the network. Although this
opportunistic caching is one of the biggest CCN advantages, it
greatly complicates deletion of stale content. We believe that,
in order to address the problem, producers need:
1) A way to communicate a single deletion request to all
routers that might have cached offending content.
2) A way to efficiently secure deletion requests (allowing
routers to quickly authenticate them) while avoiding triv-
ial Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
The first requirement is reminiscent of IP traceback – a
class of techniques for identifying the original source of a
(usually malicious) packets. In the context of IP, this is often
framed as a mechanism to help stop Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. In the context of this paper, the goal is to learn where
content was previously forwarded so that deletion requests
can be routed along the same paths. These paths correspond
to the original sources of interests for that content. Thus,
ideas from IP traceback based on packet logging (e.g., [20])
and (deterministic or probabilistic) packet marking (e.g., [21],
11449187200 is 12/04/2015 at 12:00am UTC.
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[22]) influence the design and forwarding strategies of BEAD
messages.
We now present solutions to these requirements that are
incorporated into the BEAD protocol.
V. AUTHENTICATING DELETION REQUESTS
Producers must prove content ownership to routers that
receive deletion requests. Otherwise, an adversary can imper-
sonate a producer and induce content deletion, resulting in
a form of DoS. One way to attain authentication is is by a
producer-generated digital signature on each deletion request.
However, besides being inefficient, forcing routers to verify
signatures on deletion requests can be parlayed into denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks [7], [23]. Moreover, it involves public
key retrieval, certificate handling and other messy (for routers)
issues.
Our approach uses a light-weight token that proves content
ownership. When a producer P creates a content object C, it
generates a random λ-bit string xC , called the deletion token.
P then computes the digest of this token using a suitable
cryptographic hash function2 – yC = H(xC) – and includes
yC in C. Later, if and when P wishes to delete C from the
network, it includes xC in the deletion request. (We assume
that P can route these requests to any router caching C.) Upon
receipt, each R verifies that yC (cached alongside the content)
matches H(xC). If so, R knows that P must have issued the
request and deletes C from the cache.3
VI. ROUTING DELETION REQUESTS
The remaining (though major) issue is how to route dele-
tion requests from the producer to each caching router. This
can be viewed as a multicast problem where producers must
distribute a message (deletion request) to only a subset of
nodes which could have cached the content.
Let Int[N ] and C[N ] be the interest and content messages
with the name N . The hash digest of C[N ] is a λ-bit string
d, i.e., d = H(C[N ]). Let E[N, d] be a deletion request for
content with the name N and hash digest d. Let RN be the set
of routers which cached C[N ]. Finally, let the FIB of router
R ∈ RN be FIBR.
For the rest of the paper, we use the terms erase, erase
message and erase messages to refer to deletion requests.
Also, we assume that erase messages are authenticated using
the method described in Section V.
A. Flooding
We begin by considering the simplest approach: reverse-
path controlled flooding [24] of deletion requests. When R ∈
RN receives E[N, d], it forwards it on all interfaces except
those which have a matching FIB entry, as shown in Algorithm
1.
Flooding offers some advantages, the most important of
which is the ability to reach edges of the network even if
2Suitable hash functions include those with pre-image resistance, which
means that, given y, it is difficult to find an x such that y = H(x).
3This is due to the randomness of xC and the collision-resistance of H(·).
Algorithm 1 erase-Flood
1: Input: R ∈ RN and E[N, d]
2: faceset := FIBR.Lookup(N)
3: for face /∈ faceset do
4: Forward E[N, d] to face
5: end for
routers on the producer-to-consumers paths no longer cache
the content to be deleted. This is important since routers do not
cache content uniformly and some may not even have caches.
On the negative side, the amount of traffic generated from a
single deletion request is very high and most deletion requests
would be forwarded to routers that never even had the target
content.
B. Forwarder Histories for Content Traceback
In the optimal case, routers would only forward erase
messages on interfaces to which the referenced content had
been previously forwarded. In other words, erase messages
should only be forwarded along the content distribution span-
ning tree where the producer is the root and leaves are the
consumers who requested the content. One way to forward
erase messages along the edges of this tree is for each router
R ∈ RN to maintain some forwarding history of C[N ]. There
are several places where this history can be stored, including:
(1) in the cache where C[N ] is stored, (2) in a forwarding log
(similar to [20], as a form of IP traceback) at each routers,
and (3) in the packets themselves. In each case, historical
information constitutes a form of traceback that allows routers
to identify where content was previously forwarded. We now
describe each approach in more detail.
1) In-Cache Forwarding Histories: When a router caches
C[N ] it can also remember the downstream interfaces where
the cached copy was forwarded. We denote the set of these
interfaces as FN . When a router receives an interest Int[N ]
on interface Fi, it responds with C[N ] and adds Fi to FN . For
a router with K interfaces, this additional state costs O(K) bits
per cache entry. When a router caching C[N ] receives E[N, d],
it forwards it on all interfaces in FN .
In-cache forwarding histories are only effective for routers
that have large caches, since the lifetime of forwarding in-
formation is bound to the lifetime of cache entries, which
can be small or even zero (if a router has no cache at all).
Since a forwarding history FN is deleted whenever C[N ] is
flushed from the cache, this can lead to a future E[N, d] not
being forwarded to downstream routers which might still cache
C[N ].
2) Local Forwarding Logs: Long-term packet logs have
their roots in IP traceback techniques from the early 2000-
s, e.g., [20], [25]. The problem here is similar: routers need
long-term histories of packets (content) that were previously
processed and forwarded. In this context, a history is a set-
like data structure that allows content objects to be inserted
and then later queried for membership. There are two types
of histories: lossless and lossy. The former always return
“yes” for content objects that have previously been inserted.
In contrast, a lossy history might return false positives or
negatives. Routers use these structures by associating one
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Fig. 1. E[N, d] forwarding strategy based on per-interface forwarding
histories.
history to each interface. When a router receives E[N, d] and
C[N ] is not cached, it forwards E[N, d] on each interface for
which the corresponding forwarding interface history has a
record of C[N ], i.e., all histories for which membership query
returns “yes”. This procedure is outlined in Figure 1.4
We now describe how to implement lossless and lossy his-
tories that vary in their computation and memory requirements.
Lossless Forwarder Histories require a unique identifier to
be kept after a content object has been forwarded. We assume
that content hash digest d serves as such an identifier (with
collision probability negligible in λ). Implementing this type of
forwarder history can be done trivially with a hash set HSR as
follows: to insert a content object into the history, compute and
store d in HSR. To query the history, return “yes” if d ∈ HSR
and “no” otherwise. Insertion and lookup each require constant
time.
Lossy Forwarder Histories are intended to store historical
information in memory-constrained systems at the cost of
false positives and false negatives. Similar to the SPIE trace-
back mechanism [20], we use Bloom Filters (BFs) [26] to
implement lossy forwarder histories. BFs enable the required
probabilistic set membership queries.
The choice of BF properties, e.g., size and hash functions,
impacts efficacy of this technique. Filters that saturate too
quickly result in high false positive rates. If all interface
filters become saturated then erase is effectively broadcasted.
Therefore, it is important to eventually remove stale elements
from filters. Unfortunately, a regular BF does not provide
element removal. However, so-called Counting Bloom Filters
(CBFs) [27] support set membership queries with removal.
Instead of using bits to indicate set membership, CBFs use
counters. When loading an element into CBF, the counters
corresponding to the output of the hash functions are increased
by one. Consequently, removing an elements is done by
decrementing the same counters. The problem with CBFs is
that one must know the element to delete. Since routers would
discard content after inserting them into these filters5, they
have no way of knowing what content is in the filter, and
thus what elements to eventually delete. Their only recourse
is to remove elements by decrementing counters at random.
4Similar to the flooding algorithm, this check is not performed for interfaces
via which the content producer can be reached.
5 This is because content is only added to histories upon its removal from
the cache.
Intuitively, a router would delete random elements from the
filter (the history) at a frequency which reflects the average
ExpiryTime of received content. This can increase the false
negative probability and reduce the possibility of delivering
erase messages to their corresponding destination.
Variants of the CBF, such as Time-Decaying (TDBFs) [28],
[29] and Stable (SBFs) [30] BFs can also be used. TDBFs
have the property that elements are slowly removed from the
filter over time, thereby keeping the rate of false positives
minimized. However, the natural decay property may lead to
false negatives. SBFs on the other hand are dynamically self-
resized to keep the false probabilities minimized. Similar to
CBFs and TDBFs, SBFs also suffer from false negatives.
3) Interest Marking for Content Traceback: Packet mark-
ing is a standard technique in IP traceback techiques [21]. In
the context of this work, marking is performed on interests to
indicate sources of content requests. This information can be
later used to learn the interface to which an erase needs to
be sent. Specifically, erase messages can carry this marking
information in order for routers to identify the appropriate
downstream interfaces without storing any local state.
One trivial marking method is to append the arrival inter-
face to each interest. Specifically, when R receives Int[N ] on
face Fi, R prepends (R,Fi) to a list contained in the header of
the interest. Producers record these traces upon receipt. In the
event that an erase needs to be generated, P includes the trace
in the erase and forwards it on the appropriate downstream
interface. When R receives an erase with a trace it pops the
last element (R,Fi) off the trace list and forwards it on the
specified interface Fi.
This technique distributes the forwarding history among
messages in the network. As a consequence, this information
must be secure. To illustrate this requirement, assume router
Ri receives E[N, d] with the sequence of hops
[(Ri, Fi), (Ri−1, Fi−1), . . . , (R2, F2), (R1, F1)]
from interface Fi+1. Ri needs a way to securely guarantee that
the tuple (Ri, Fi) was previously prepended, by itself, to the
subsequence:
[(Ri−1, Fi−1), . . . , (R2, F2), (R1, F1)].
Otherwise, malicious entities can forge unsolicited erase mes-
sages with apparently correct routing sequences. Alternatively,
one can modify existing sequences in erase messages to
prevent them from being routed towards their destination.
One way of authenticating hop-sequence traces is for Ri
can compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [31],
[32] tag ti over the (relevant) interest details, e.g., the name
and previously present traces in the hop-sequence. Ri then
adds the tuple (Ri, Fi, ti) to the interest before forwarding it.
Since erase messages carry the name of the content to be
deleted, each router will be able to verify its pre-computed
tag before forwarding erase messages downstream. Since
routers compute and verify tags locally, a key management and
distribution protocol is not required. We do, however, assume
that routers are able to generate and maintain cryptographic
keys of sufficient length necessary for MAC computation. As
an added feature, hop-sequence information can also be used
for detecting both interest and erase loops [33].
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Although this technique of marking interest is effective to
deliver erase messages to all routers on the path between
consumers and producers, it has several drawbacks. One of
this is that interest traces received by producers need to be
stored so that they can be included in erase messages. This
due to the fact that (1) each trace corresponds to only one path
in the network, and (2) interests issued by multiple consumers
are most likely to traverse different paths to the producer.
Producers can attempt to compile all collected traces in a
data structure forming a spanning tree. This structure would
be included in erase message headers, allowing routers to
forwarder erase messages correctly. The main disadvantage
of this approach is that the size of the data structure grows
linearly with the number of consumers and is most likely to
be greater than average allowed MTU. This means that erase
messages will be fragmented (and possibly re-fragmented), and
hop-by-hop reassembly is not avoidable. Another alternative
is for producers to send multiple erase messages one for
each set of traces correlated to a hop-sequence. In Section
VII, we compare and evaluate the performance and resource
consumption of these two techniques.
VII. ANALYSIS
In this section we assess some routing strategies for erase
messages. Let nRt be the total number of content objects
forwarded by R at time t and let µRF be R’s content forwarding
rate. Note that nRt grows monotonically as a function of µ
R
F .
A. Flooding Analysis
Recall that the reverse path flooding algorithm works by
only sending broadcast messages to interfaces through which
the producer is not reachable. Though very effective, this
method is highly unscalable. If all routers operate according
to Algorithm 1, then erase messages are guaranteed to be
delivered to every R ∈ RN . However, the number of routers
receiving a specific erase message is much larger than |RN |.
Therefore, flooding should always be the last resort for erase
messages. We assess the actual overhead of this technique in
Section VIII.
B. Forwarding History Analysis
We now analyze performance of lossless and lossy for-
warding histories described in Section VI-B.
1) Lossless Histories: The memory (and possibly computa-
tional) cost of a lossless forwarder history grows as a function
of t. Thus, history collection will inevitably saturate memory
at some point. Let nRmax be the total size (in entries) of the
history memory for R. Saturation is reached at time t such
that nRt ≥ nRmax. We compute the time required to saturate
a lossless forwarder history in two scenarios. We assume that
each content object is 4, 096 bytes and hash digests are 32
bytes.
• Consumer-facing router: Assume a caching consumer-
facing router (e.g., an access point) with 4GB of history
storage and data rate of 100 Mbps. This data rate is
equivalent to a content forwarding rate of µRF = 3
′200
Cps (content per second). If the router operates at full
capacity with a full cache – i.e., storing every forwarded
content requires the eviction of an already cached one – it
will take 41, 943 secs. for history storage to be saturated.
This is roughly 12 hours. This window of time might be
longer than the ExpiryTime of content objects that are
subject to be erased. For instance, news feed pages are
likely to be updated with a frequency faster than 1/12
hours.
• Core router: Assume a non-caching CCN core router
with 1TB of flash history storage and data rate of 10
Tbps, i.e., equivalent to µRF = 335 MCps. Assuming
such a router is always working at full capacity (always
forwarding 10 Tbps), the lossless forwarder history can
be saturated in 102 secs. In this case producers have a
time window of less than 2 minutes to issue an erase
message for content C after it was last served.
R’s saturation time can be lengthened by increasing the
available size of the forwarder history. However, at this rate,
the cost of adding more memory to make the saturation time
useful is far too expensive (1TB for 2 minutes of history).
A very natural question arises: what happens when R’s
history storage is saturated? R can evict old history entries
randomly or according to some policy, e.g., LRU. However,
keeping track of history entries’ ages might lead to reduced
performance. Another alternative is to divide history storage
into smaller chunks, each corresponding to a set time window
of history entries. Once history storage is saturated, the oldest
chunk is erased to provide space for new entries. Using
the consuming-facing router example above, 4GB of history
storage can be divided into 12 chunks, each corresponding to
one hour. The router could then erase the history recorded 12
hours ago in order to store history entries for the coming hour.
2) Lossy Histories: Lossy histories are useful when lossless
histories are too expensive, e.g., in core network routers. Our
approach to lossy forwarder history is based on Bloom Filters
(BFs) – probabilistic data structures with tunable performance.
Given an m-bit BF that stores n elements, the number of
input hash functions k can be optimized and false positive
probability can be estimated using Equation 1 [34]. Note that
optimal value of k is also given as a function of m an n.
f(m, ·, n) ≈ (0.6185)mn , k = ln(2) · m
n
(1)
In practice, a router can optimizes the number of hash func-
tions in order to lower false positive probability. An upper
bound of k can be set to limit hashing overhead.
As mentioned above, standard BFs do not support entry
deletion, which is necessary to deal with the saturation prob-
lem. As indicated in [20], historical information for Internet-
scale traffic (IP packets) can not last beyond a few minutes,
which might still be less than what we needed for BEAD.
We now analyze lossy forwarding history in the context of
two scenarios mentioned above with the same history storage
and data rates. We also assume that each content object added
to 4BF changes the value of new distinct k bits from 0 to
1. Clearly, this is unrealistic, since we do not consider the
possibility of overlapping of hash function outputs for different
input elements. However, this assumption captures the worst-
case scenario.
• Consumer-facing router: To maintain a maximum false
positive probability of 10−32, a BF of size 4GB can fit
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n ≤ 2 × 108 elements. Based on Equation 1, it requires
k = 120 hash functions. Thus, it will take 89′478 secs. (a
little over one day) for forwarder history to be saturated.
• Core router: To maintain the same false positive proba-
bility, a BF of size 1TB can accommodate n ≤ 5.7× 108
elements, which corresponds to k = 107 hash functions.
Forwarding history will be saturated in 245 secs.
One major drawback to using BFs for lossy forwarding histo-
ries is that history saturation is more difficult to resolve. Recall
that, with lossless histories, a router can remove old entries in
order to add new ones. A router could also delete the oldest
chunk of the history once it is saturated. However, with lossy
histories, a router can either: (1) flush the entire lossy history
and start over, or (2) use CBFs which support element deletion
with the use of counters. Unfortunately, this introduces false
negative probabilities.
3) Packet Marking Analysis: Packet marking is compu-
tationally inexpensive since it requires a single MAC com-
putation per (either interest or erase) packet. However, its
drawback is increased memory footprint of the interest along
every hop. Recall that traces in the hop-sequence consist of: (1)
router identifier, (2) interface identifier, and (3) tag. Assuming
a 2-byte interface identifier and a SHA-256-based MAC, the
total size of each trace is 38 bytes. This corresponds to extra
608 bytes for each interest, assuming a 16-hop router-level
path.6
We now compare two hop-sequence techniques described
in Section VI-B3. Assume a tree topology with (1) one
producer P at the root with height h, (2) 2h consumers at
the leaves with height 0, and (3) 2h − 2 routers. We assume
all consumers request content C and all routers append hop-
sequence traces to the corresponding interests. In this case, P
receives 2h interests, each with h − 1 traces. If P includes
all these traces in a single erase message, its size would be
grow by
(
2h · (h− 1))× 38 bytes. This becomes 35MB for
h = 16, which is clearly impractical.7 On the other hand, if P
decides to send a separate erase to each consumer it would
generate 2h erase messages. The same overall volume of
traces (35MB) will be sent from P to consumers. However, it
would be split into numerous erase messages. One advantage
is that erase messages size will likely not exceed the path
MTU and therefore not require fragmentation.
C. Summary of the BEAD Protocol
Various approaches for routing erase messages are prac-
tical in different network locations. For instance, consumer-
facing (caching) routers can keep lossless or lossy histories for
at least a day. Meanwhile, interest marking is better for core
network routers. Therefore, we believe that all aforementioned
techniques can be used in combination for routing erase
messages. Our recommendations are:
1) If R supports interest marking and the first tuple in the
hop-sequence traces is valid and appended by the router
itself, then information in the tuple is used to route the
erase downstream.
6The average Internet hop-count is currently 16 [35].
7We defer designing a more efficient scheme for combining hop-sequence
traces to future work.
2) If the content is in R’s cache, then the in-cache history
is used to route the erase.
3) If the content is not in R’s cache, but R keeps lossless
or lossy histories, then they are used for erase message
routing.
4) Otherwise, R floods received erase messages according
to Algorithm 1.
Recommendation 1 is most appropriate for core network
routers, 2 and 3 for less busy edge network routers, and 4
as a failover mechanism. Most routers would likely prefer to
drop erase messages instead of flooding them. This is why
BEAD is a best-effort protocol: it does not guarantee that each
erase message will be delivered to all entities caching the
target content.
As mentioned before, not all published content is subject to
future deletion. If routers can make this distinction, then there
is no need to record history entries about content that will
not be deleted. Such distinction can be achieved by adding
an optional CanERASE flag to content object headers. If this
flag is not present, the default behavior is to assume that no
erase messages will be sent for the corresponding content.
Moreover, interests requesting content that will not be deleted
are not required to be marked by routers. Producers could
tell consumers what content is subject to deletion (i.e., an
erase) by overloading catalogs or manifests. As described
in [7] and [36], catalogs and manifests contain lists of Self-
Certifying Names (SCNs) of content to be requested. This list
is provided by the producer and can contain the CanERASE
flag alongside each SCN. In this case, the interest header
format should be modified to include this optional flag. Since
it is not guaranteed that all content objects will be requested
using SCNs, i.e., catalogs, the default behavior of (core) routers
is to append hop-sequence traces to interests if the CanERASE
flag is missing.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATIONS
Our experimental simulations are focused on two prop-
erties of BEAD: network overhead (in terms of additional
bytes added for erase messages) and forwarder overhead for
processing erase messages, i.e., the average amount of time
it takes to process each erase.
A. Network Overhead
To measure the network overhead due to generating and
forwarding erase messages we extended ndnSIM 2.0 [37] –
an implementation of NDN architecture as a NS-3 [38] module
for simulation purposes – to support erase messages. With this
modified architecture, we ran two sets of experiments using the
following topologies (shown in Figure 2):
• The DFN network, Deutsches ForschungsNetz (German
Research Network) [39], [40]: a German network devel-
oped for research and education purposes which consists
of 30 connected routers positioned in different areas of
Germany. The blue dots in the figure represent group of
consumers (10 consumers per blue dot) connected to edge
routers (red dots), while the green dots represent core
network routers.
• The AT&T backbone network [41]. This consists of
over 130 routers. Each logical consumer in the figure
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Fig. 2. The DFN and AT&T topologies.
represents multiple (5) physical consumers connected to
an edge router.
In all experiments, consumers issue requests at a rate of
10 interests per second for content with the name prefix
/prefix/A and monotonically increasing sequence number
suffix. Every router uses a lossless history to record previously
forwarded content objects for erase forwarding. Lastly, pro-
ducers issue erase messages for 50% of their content every
1 second. Under these conditions, we measure router packet
processing overhead with respect to content objects and erase
messages. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) compare the overhead of
processing content objects and erase messages in the DFN
topology with 160 consumers. Similarly, Figures 3(c) and 3(d)
show the same type of overhead in the AT&T topology with
the same number of consumers. Comparatively, we find that
erase messages contribute very little overhead to the network
with respect to the bandwidth consumed by content objects.
Specifically, the total amount of erase messages traffic in
the DFN topology is 1.8% of the total content objects traffic,
whereas it is only 0.09% in the AT&T topology.
We also assessed the actual computational overhead in-
curred by each router in these scenarios. The average time
to process a single erase message for the DFN and AT&T
scenarios are shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). We see that only
a subset of the routers incur greater than 1.0ms to process
an erase. These routers are those closest to the producer
since they almost always receive, store, and forward erase
messages.
IX. MONETIZING CONTENT DELETION
We now discuss potential economic incentives for routers
and ISPs to support content deletion and implement the BEAD
protocol.
A. BEAD with Accounting
So far, we discussed how the network routes erase
messages towards routers that possibly cache corresponding
content. The main challenge is that producers do not know
where such content is cached. We also acknowledge that
BEAD is a best-effort protocol, unless flooding is used, which
is undesirable.
However, if producers knew exactly where content is
cached, then erase messages could be routed efficiently. For
example, if a producer knew that a particular AS had a copy
of the content cached by some node in the system, then the
producer could specifically ask the AS to distribute an erase
internally. This is far superior to routing erase messages in
the core of the network in hopes that they might reach this AS
(and any others with a cached copy).
We believe that it is possible to distribute content caching
location information along with accounting information. In
a recent secure CCN accounting scheme [42], Ghali et al.
propose that routers should notify producers of content they
serve from caches by sending a so-called “push interest” or
pInt. This approach can be modified such that: (1) AS gateways
send pInt messages when content is cached in their domain
and (2) pInt messages carry the prefix of an AS accounting
management server within the AS.8 Whenever a producer
wants to delete certain content, it sends an erase message
to each accounting management server (one per AS) that
previously reported caching corresponding content. Then, the
latter distribute the erase message within their ASs. Intra-
AS distribution can be achieved via techniques described in
Section VI. In fact, flooding might well be appropriate for
that purpose since erase messages would not traverse AS
boundaries.
The relationship between accounting and BEAD is natural.
This is because one of the important applications of accounting
is to bill for cache space. From an economic perspective, it
would not be surprising for in-network caching to become a
paid service. Routers and ASs could offer caching services for
producers. A reasonable extension to this service would be to
also offer a deletion service via BEAD.
8Accounting management servers are centralized entities that manage ac-
counting activities inside the AS.
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(a) Data processing overhead in the DFN topology with 160 consumers. (b) erase messages processing overhead in the DFN topology with 160
consumers.
(c) Data processing overhead in the AT&T topology with 160 consumers. (d) erase messages processing overhead in the AT&T topology with 160
consumers.
Fig. 3. Network overhead from processing erase messages. Routers are identified by integers in the range [160..189]. InData (OutData) and InErase (OutErase)
correspond to the amount of content object and erase traffic received from (sent to) an upstream (downstream) node, respectively. Ingress data is shown in red
and egress data is shown in blue.
B. BEAD in the Core
Flooding in the network core is not a viable as a means
of distributing erase messages. Moreover, forwarder histories
and packet marking are (relatively) expensive operations and
too costly for the fast path in the core. ISPs will likely just
drop these messages due to a lack of economic incentive to
forward them. Thus, in any plausible CCN network – where
producers and consumers are at the edges of a network, while
most traffic is routed through the core – erase messages are
most likely to be propagated along only half of producer-to-
consumer path(s). This is troublesome since content is most
likely to be cached near consumers in edge (or near-edge)
routers, and erase messages might never reach these routers.
To address this issue, core routers must be incentivized
to carry and forward erase messages from producers to con-
sumers. Since erase messages will typically amplify traffic,
producers should be expected to pay for this increase. As
before, this effectively turns BEAD into a service provided
by ISPs that complements monetized caching; producers who
pay for cache space may also have the choice to pay for on-
demand deletion via BEAD.
X. CONCLUSION
We proposed BEAD – a best-effort autonomous deletion
protocol. BEAD is designed to solve the problem of stale
or unsafe content in CCN. We described an efficient and
lightweight form of authenticator for BEAD deletion requests
and discussed several ways in which they could be routed
from producers to consumers. We assessed the performance
of each technique and verified the network overhead and
deletion “penetration” using simulations. For future work, we
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(a) DFN topology with 160 consumers. (b) AT&T topology with 160 consumers.
Fig. 4. Forward erase processing overhead in the DFN and AT&T topologies. The results are captured for each of the routes assessed in the bandwidth
overhead experiments. Routers are identified by integers in the range [160..189] and correspond to the routers in Figure 3.
will formalize the integration of accounting and BEAD to form
a comprehensive platform for monetized caching in CCN.
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